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ABSTRACT 
  Because of the expense of defending white-collar criminal cases, 
individual corporate defendants can rarely fund their own defenses 
and often rely on their employers to pay their legal costs. Employers, 
however, often feel pressure to refuse to pay their employees’ 
attorneys’ fees. When employers decline to pay their employees’ 
defense costs, defendants can be, in effect, coerced into pleading guilty 
because they do not have the financial resources to defend themselves 
at trial. 
  Commentators have discussed the problem of pressure on white-
collar defendants but have not traced the cause of the pressure back to 
one of its most basic roots: criminalizing conduct that is prohibitively 
expensive for an individual to defend. Others have addressed the 
question of whether corporate behavior has been overcriminalized 
but have not focused on the high cost of defending these crimes as one 
of the key arguments against criminalizing the behavior in the first 
place. This Note intertwines the two strands of the debate over 
corporate crime: the strand evaluating the existence of and solutions 
to pressure on individual white-collar defendants and the strand 
questioning the overcriminalization of corporate law. This Note adds 
to both strands by focusing on one aspect, high defense costs, that 
contributes to the pressure, makes it unique to corporate crime as 
opposed to street crime, and puts it out of the reach of commonly 
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suggested procedural fixes. The Note concludes that white-collar 
criminal prosecutions inherently place financial pressure on 
defendants, and legislatures should consider this pressure when 
deciding what behavior to criminalize. 
INTRODUCTION 
The often uncertain outcomes of criminal trials mean that even 
innocent defendants can face a terrifying choice: accept a minimal 
punishment by admitting that they have committed a crime they feel 
they did not commit or risk being found guilty at trial and being 
subject to a sentence many times as harsh. This was the choice facing 
Jamie Olis, a midlevel executive accused of wrongdoing in an energy 
transaction during his employment at Dynegy.1 Unlike many criminal 
defendants, Olis was far from indigent (although not wealthy) and 
was able to afford an attorney, making him ineligible for a public 
defender.2 His defense was also unlike most criminal defenses: the 
conduct in question involved a “complex series of [financial] 
transactions” that a layperson would struggle to understand.3 
Although Dynegy had promised its executives funding for defending 
job-related allegations, the firm breached its obligation under threat 
of indictment and left Olis to fend for himself.4 Still, Olis was sure of 
his innocence, believed he was acting according to accepted business 
practices, and decided to go to trial with the defense that he could 
afford.5 
Unfortunately, Olis’s defense proved to be less than he hoped 
for6 and very likely less than he would have gotten if Dynegy had 
 
 1. Susan Warren, Refusing to Talk, Dynegy’s Olis Goes to Prison, WALL ST. J., May 20, 
2004, at B1. 
 2. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (2006) (“[T]he United States magistrate judge or the court, if 
satisfied after appropriate inquiry that the person is financially unable to obtain counsel, shall 
appoint counsel to represent him.”). Whether the counsel Olis could afford was “adequate” 
under § 3006A(a), given the high costs of defending white-collar crime, is a difficult question. 
See infra Part III.B.1.b. 
 3. Rebecca Smith, Fraud Charged Against Former Dynegy Employees, WALL ST. J., June 
13, 2003, at B2. 
 4. Paul Davies & David Reilly, Executives on Trial: In KPMG Case, the Thorny Issue of 
Legal Fees—Dynegy’s Mr. Olis, Now in Prison, Shows Stakes in Trial of Accounting Firm’s 
Executives, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2007, at C5. 
 5. See Warren, supra note 1 (reporting that “Mr. Olis . . . insisted on his innocence 
and . . . began to prepare for a trial” with a defense theory that he was following orders from 
other Dynegy employees). 
 6. Id. 
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honored its agreement to indemnify him. His lawyer did not contest 
the government’s evidence of market loss, which became a key factor 
in lengthening Olis’s sentence7 and probably would have required 
hiring an expensive expert.8 Olis was sentenced to twenty-four years 
and four months in jail,9 and his lawyer later said that the lack of 
funds had “limited his ability to mount a strong defense.”10 
Jamie Olis’s sentence was later reduced to six years on appeal,11 
but his ordeal has been cited as an example of the problems faced by 
white-collar defendants whose employers refuse to pay their legal 
fees.12 During his trial, Olis “couldn’t afford the $100,000 to print the 
[12 million pages of] documents” that the government had “used 
computer programs to sort through.”13 As opposed to the one lawyer 
that Olis could afford, who Olis could only pay by selling his house, 
“[t]he government had prosecutors, Federal Bureau of Investigation 
agents, postal inspectors and accounting experts work the case.”14 The 
Olis case shows the “astronomical,” costs of defending corporate 
criminal allegations15—even the wealthiest white-collar defendants 
cannot afford to fund their defenses on their own.16 Olis may be the 
most sympathetic of the high-profile defendants who have faced the 
pressures of the white-collar criminal justice system, as he is relatively 
young, less wealthy than many white-collar defendants, and was 
separated from his young daughter when he reported to prison.17 But 
 
 7. United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 548 (5th Cir. 2005); Kevin P. McCormick, 
Comment, Untangling the Capricious Effect of Market Loss in Securities Fraud Sentencing, 82 
TUL. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (2008). 
 8. See McCormick, supra note 7, at 1174 (“[One] problem with market loss is that the 
complexity of the calculations involved invariably places an onerous burden on both defendants 
and prosecutors to provide costly experts. . . . [T]hese costs can be a huge burden on individual 
defendants facing criminal charges.”). 
 9. Olis, 429 F.3d at 541. 
 10. Davies & Reilly, supra note 4. 
 11. Posting of Peter Lattman to WSJ.com Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/06/12/ 
white-collar-legal-fees-kpmg-jamie-olis (June 12, 2007, 8:50 EST). Olis’s new lawyers did not 
disclose how they were paid. Id. 
 12. See, e.g., Davies & Reilly, supra note 4 (using Olis’s case as a “vivid illustration of 
what’s at stake” when the government presses a defendant’s former employer to stop paying his 
legal fees). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Susan Beck, Companies with Backdating Troubles Are Paying Astronomical Legal 
Fees, AM. LAW., Oct. 2007, at 22, 22 (documenting legal fees in stock-option backdating cases). 
 16. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.  
 17. See Warren, supra note 1 (noting that Olis was thirty-eight, had an infant daughter, and 
“was no highflying executive”). 
RIBSTEIN IN FINAL.DOC 2/10/2009  12:03:30 PM 
860 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:857 
his plight is far from unique among those individuals attempting to 
defend allegations of corporate misconduct. 
Because of the expense of defending white-collar criminal cases, 
individual corporate defendants can rarely, if ever, fund their own 
defenses; instead, these defendants rely on their employers to pay 
their legal costs.18 Their employers, however, often feel pressure to 
refuse to pay their employees’ attorneys’ fees.19 When employers 
decline to pay their employees’ defense costs, defendants end up with 
inadequate defense funds and find themselves in the position of Jamie 
Olis: they must either plead guilty or go to trial with a lawyer who 
cannot fully defend them against the complicated allegations 
corporate crime cases usually involve. Defendants are, in effect, 
coerced into pleading guilty because they simply do not have the 
financial resources to defend themselves at trial, where they often risk 
harsh sentences many times greater than the ones they could receive 
under a plea bargain.20 
There have been several attempts to alleviate the pressures faced 
by defendants who cannot afford their own defense costs. Both Judge 
Louis Kaplan in the Southern District of New York and a panel of the 
Second Circuit have found that the Sixth Amendment prevents the 
government from pressuring firms to refuse to advance attorneys’ 
fees to employees who are under criminal investigation.21 Judge 
 
 18. See, e.g., Laurence A. Urgenson & Audrey Harris, Is the White-Collar Defense Attorney 
Headed for Extinction?, LJN BUS. CRIMES BULL., May 2006, at 1, 2, available at http://www. 
kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?contentID=223&itemId=2294 (“Even if an individual defendant 
is able to scrape together enough money to keep his counsel, few can afford the experts, 
accountants, investigators and support staff that it takes to sort through (much less, make sense 
of) the warehouses of material that their ‘cooperating’ employer gave the government.”). 
 19. See infra Part II.B. 
 20. One of the clearest illustrations of this phenomenon was in the prosecution of former 
Enron executives. See John R. Emshwiller, Skilling Gets 24 Years in Prison—Enron Ex-CEO 
Faced Longer Term for Fraud, Conspiracy Conviction; Victims Fund to Get $45 Million, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 24, 2006, at C1 (“Yesterday’s sentence also underscored the dangers of going to trial 
versus the benefits of pleading guilty and cooperating with federal investigators. Andrew 
Fastow, Enron’s former chief financial officer, received a six-year sentence after he pleaded 
guilty to criminal charges and helped the government in its case against Messrs. Skilling [who 
was sentenced to twenty-four years and four months in prison] and Lay.”); see also Ellen S. 
Podgor, The Challenge of White Collar Sentencing, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 731, 751 & 
n.123 (2007) (“Deciding whether to take the risk [to go to trial] may also be a function of 
money, as the cost of legal counsel can influence the ability to spend the sums necessary for a 
trial . . . .”). 
 21. United States v. Stein (Stein V), 541 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Stein 
(Stein IV), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. 
Supp. 2d. 330, 367–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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Kaplan found that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
provides similar protection.22 Senator Arlen Specter introduced 
legislation that would prevent the government from considering 
whether a corporation is paying its employees’ legal fees when 
deciding whether to indict.23 Deputy Attorneys General Paul McNulty 
and Mark Filip created revised Department of Justice (DOJ) policies 
that first lessened,24 and then eliminated,25 prosecutors’ ability to 
consider whether an employer is paying its employees’ legal fees. 
Many scholars, lawyers, and policymakers have discussed the 
problem26 (or lack thereof27) of pressure on individual white-collar 
defendants. Some have argued that the Constitution should protect 
white-collar defendants from prosecutorial pressure.28 Some have 
suggested nonconstitutional methods of constraining prosecutorial 
power.29 Some have contended that broad corporate criminal liability 
 
 22. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 364–65. 
 23. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, S. 30, 109th Cong. § 3(b)(2)(B). 
 24. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys 11 n.3 (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty 
Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf. 
 25. Memorandum from Mark R. Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Heads 
of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys 13 (Aug. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Filip Memorandum], 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/readingroom/dag-memo-08282008.pdf. 
 26. See, e.g., Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: 
Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 56 (2007) 
(“[C]ourts, commentators, and practitioners should more seriously consider the connection 
between the overbroad corporate criminal liability rule and the risk of overreaching by 
prosecutors who use their legally-conferred blank check to ferret out corporate crime.”); Noah 
D. Stein, Note, Prosecutorial Ethics and the McNulty Memo: Should the Government Scrutinize 
an Organization’s Payment of its Employees’ Attorneys’ Fees?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3245, 3276 
(2007) (“[Commentators] argue that a policy that emphasizes cooperation significantly 
augments the government’s power.”); Larry E. Ribstein, Perils of Criminalizing Agency Costs 10 
(Ill. Law & Econ. Working Papers Series, Working Paper No. LE06-021, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=920140 (“The government retains significant power to coerce 
cooperation from defendants.”). 
 27. See Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1617 
(2007) (“[S]eeing these differences in context reduces worry about the state’s current practices 
and leads to a response to the calls for reform that, at most, would modestly restrain the state in 
some respects.”); Peter Margulies, Legal Hazard: Corporate Crime, Advancement of Executives’ 
Defense Costs, and the Federal Courts, 7 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 2 (2006), http://blj.ucdavis.edu/ 
article.asp?id=641 (referring favorably to the government’s consideration, when deciding 
whether to indict, of a corporation’s advancement of defense costs to its employees). 
 28. E.g., Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal 
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 353 (2007) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment should afford 
employees some protection against the adverse consequences of coerced disclosures . . . .”). 
 29. Stein, supra note 26, at 3292–93 (suggesting that clarifying the McNulty Memorandum 
could curb prosecutorial pressure). 
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standards necessarily give prosecutors too much power.30 
Commentators have not, however, traced the cause of the pressure 
back to one of its most basic roots: criminalizing certain conduct that 
is prohibitively expensive for an individual to defend. Those who 
have addressed the question of what behavior Congress should 
criminalize in the first place have not recognized that legislatures 
must consider the pressures high legal fees place on individuals.31 
This Note intertwines two strands of the debate over corporate 
crime: the strand evaluating the existence of and solutions to undue 
pressure on individual white-collar defendants and the strand 
questioning the overcriminalization of corporate law. It adds to both 
strands by focusing on one aspect of the pressure on white-collar 
defendants: high defense costs. These abnormally high costs increase 
the pressure, make it unique to corporate crime, put it out of the 
reach of commonly suggested procedural fixes, and make it an 
important consideration in criminalizing corporate behavior. The 
Note concludes that the pressure from high defense costs on white-
collar defendants is something that policymakers and society should 
consider when deciding what behavior to criminalize. 
Part I of this Note discusses the legal background necessary to 
appreciate the expenses that individual white-collar defendants face 
when defending allegations of corporate misconduct, exploring the 
aspects of white-collar crime cases that make these defense costs so 
high. Part II argues that the high costs of defending corporate 
criminal charges create dilemmas for white-collar defendants that are 
significantly different than the dilemmas facing defendants in 
traditional crime (or “street-crime”) cases, making white-collar 
defendants uniquely vulnerable to coercion during prosecutions. Part 
III examines several options available to corporations, courts, and 
regulators when dealing with the coercion white-collar defendants 
 
 30. See, e.g., Bharara, supra note 26, at 105 (“[T]he criticism of prosecutorial discretion is a 
systemic one, which cannot be overcome either by pointing to discretion well-exercised in the 
past or by addressing prosecutors’ conduct only.”); Ribstein, supra note 26, at 10 (“The 
wrongdoing in [corporate criminal] cases is subtle, blame difficult to apportion, and facts hard to 
find.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, What Is a Business Crime?, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 127 passim 
(2008) (discussing the problems with criminalizing corporate misconduct, but not including legal 
fees among the problems discussed); Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing 
Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23 passim (Summer 1997) (same); Dick 
Thornburgh, The Dangers of Over-Criminalization and the Need for Real Reform: The Dilemma 
of Artificial Entities and Artificial Crimes, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279 passim (2007) (same); 
Ribstein, supra note 26 passim (same). 
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face: corporate employment indemnification provisions, 
constitutional protection through the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 
and stricter standards for prosecutorial misconduct. This Part 
demonstrates that all are inadequate solutions to the problem, 
concluding that the problem is inherent in prosecuting individuals for 
these crimes. The Note concludes by recommending that pressures on 
individual defendants created by high defense costs must begin to be 
a consideration in the debate over how to criminalize corporate 
crime. 
I.  EXPLAINING THE HIGH COSTS OF DEFENDING CORPORATE 
CRIME 
The high defense costs in corporate criminal cases stem from the 
legal, factual, and mens rea questions that must be addressed in 
white-collar criminal investigations.32 As many commentators argue, 
prosecutors should have every tool available to them because the 
types of inquiries involved in white-collar crime make these cases 
very difficult to prosecute.33 The difficulty of investigating corporate 
activity means that prosecutors may only be able obtain answers 
through wide prosecutorial discretion and some cooperation from 
employees and corporations.34 These difficulties for the prosecution, 
however, translate to three equally knotty problems for defendants, 
who also have limited resources to cover the costs involved in 
answering the complex questions involved and who have much more 
to lose by choosing to go to trial. 
First, the substantive legal questions are inherently difficult to 
answer because of the wide variety of behavior that could be 
considered criminal misconduct under federal law. Standards for 
criminality are vague, unsettled, and still developing,35 leaving unclear 
 
 32. See John Hasnas, Foreword to Corporate Criminality: Legal, Ethical and Managerial 
Implications, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1269, 1269–70 (2007) (discussing the costs these questions 
create for prosecutors in white-collar cases). Professor Hasnas points out that difficult legal, 
factual, and mens rea questions make it hard to determine when to criminalize corporate 
misconduct. This Note uses these three peculiar aspects of white-collar crime to explain the high 
costs of defending it and to distinguish its inherent procedural problems from those in the 
street-crime context. 
 33. See, e.g., Michael Elston, Cooperation with the Government Is Good for Companies, 
Investors, and the Economy, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1435, 1437–38 (2007) (describing the 
difficulties of investigating corporate crime when a company does not cooperate). 
 34. See Griffin, supra note 28, at 340–41 (“Unraveling the threads of an intricate corporate 
fraud scheme without extensive cooperation is also a daunting challenge . . . .”). 
 35. Lynch, supra note 31, at 37. 
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the legality of the corporation’s activity even assuming the activity 
occurred. For one thing, a great deal of what is criminal differs only 
subtly from standard business practices, as the widespread practice of 
backdating illustrates.36 Sometimes the conduct in question has been 
made illegal only recently, such as the tax shelters at issue in KPMG’s 
case, so that the exact contours of the illegality remain unclear.37 As a 
result, defendants can find it very difficult to predict the charges or 
the outcome of the investigation because of the broad definitions of 
corporate crime and the lack of precedent with which to predict 
outcomes. This problem requires lawyers specializing in corporate 
crime, who are often very expensive to retain. The flexibility of broad 
corporate criminal laws means that prosecutors can effectively 
determine whether criminal liability attaches to the conduct in 
question.38 Congress has exacerbated this problem by criminalizing a 
wide variety of corporate activity, “heighten[ing] the vulnerability of 
individual employees,”39 and increasing penalties without always 
providing clear standards for liability.40 
Second, the factual questions involved in corporate crime require 
a costly process of sorting through all of the records created by a huge 
business. Investigators and lawyers examining the inner workings of 
corporations need to sift through extensive paper trails and interview 
 
 36. See David I. Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis and Observations on 
the Stock Option Scandal, 87 B.U. L. REV. 561, 566 (2007) (“Backdating has accounting 
consequences when discovered, but few instances of backdating were motivated by accounting 
concerns, and backdating does not represent an accounting scandal along the lines of those 
perpetrated at Enron, WorldCom, or Tyco.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees Jeffrey Stein et al. at 88 n.34, United States v. Stein (Stein 
V), 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-3042) (“[T]he tax shelters in this case have never been 
brought before a judge, so their legality and legitimacy has never been settled as a point of 
law. . . . That gives this KPMG trial an Alice-in-Wonderland quality; the accused are on trial for 
promoting a fraudulent tax shelter that has never been proved to be fraudulent in the first 
place.” (quotation error in original) (quoting Editorial, KPMG in Wonderland, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 6, 2005, at A14)). 
 38. See Lynch, supra note 31, at 37 (“Prosecutors and courts, moreover, have utilized the 
broad discretion created by the criminalization of regulatory misconduct or by the vague terms 
of some criminal statutes, to change the terms in which certain forms of misbehavior are seen, 
and the consequences that attach to violations.”). 
 39. Griffin, supra note 28, at 331 (referring to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
 40. Lynch, supra note 31, at 37 (“Congress, and the sentencing commission it created to 
systematize criminal punishment, have significantly increased the de jure and de facto levels of 
punishment for violations in many areas, including the provision of severe sanctions for some of 
these innovative and sometimes poorly defined crimes.”). 
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many witnesses to have any hope of figuring out what conduct 
actually occurred.41 For example, in KPMG’s case, the court observed, 
The government thus far has produced in discovery, in electronic or 
paper form, at least 5 million to 6 million pages of documents plus 
transcripts of 335 depositions and 195 income tax returns. The briefs 
on pretrial motions passed the 1,000-page mark some time ago. The 
government expects its case in chief to last three months, while 
defendants expect theirs to be lengthy as well. To prepare for and 
try a case of such length requires substantial resources.42 
Costs in white-collar crime cases can become extremely high very 
early in the criminal process, such that without an advancement of 
their defense costs, white-collar defendants may have to give up on 
their defense before really beginning.43 
Third, determining culpability in white-collar crime requires a 
difficult examination of the knowledge and subjective intentions of 
numerous employees of the corporation with various levels of 
responsibility. These questions are not about whether conduct was 
criminal, but about whether an individual defendant’s consciousness 
of the potential impropriety of his conduct reaches the necessary level 
of scienter for criminality.44 There can be a subtle difference between 
culpable and nonculpable mens rea of individuals, especially because 
each individual is a small part of the organization and it is difficult to 
tell how much the players knew about how their conduct fit into the 
larger scheme of the firm’s operations. For instance, employees of 
General Re charged with being involved in a fraudulent reinsurance 
transaction have argued that Warren Buffett and other supervisors 
authorized the employees’ actions and that they therefore could not 
 
 41. See, e.g., Urgenson & Harris, supra note 18, at 2 (referring to the “warehouses of 
material” that can be produced in corporate-crime cases). 
 42. United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 43. Id. at 355 (stating that fee advancement “protects the ‘ability [of the employee] to 
mount . . . a defense . . . by safeguarding his ability to meet his expenses at the time they arise, 
and to secure counsel on the basis of such an assurance’” (alterations in original) (quoting 
United States v. Weissman, No. S2 94 Cr. 760 (CSH), 1997 WL 334966, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. June 
16, 1997) (mem.))). 
 44. See Buell, supra note 27, at 1628 (“Mens rea both dominates the law of white collar 
crime and is distinctive there in relation to other precincts of criminal law. Inquiry into mental 
state in white collar cases often progresses past relatively thin cognitive states like the Model 
Penal Code’s ‘knowledge’ or ‘purpose’ to concepts such as ‘willfulness,’ ‘bad purpose,’ and 
‘consciousness of wrongdoing.’”). 
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have acted wrongfully.45 Such a “deep inquiry into mental state”46 is 
hard to perform in the context of organizations that “tend to diffuse 
decision-making responsibility.”47 Further obscuring the inquiry into 
precisely who knew what and when, employees who know or fear that 
they were involved in misconduct have an incentive to further impede 
the search for truth.48 
The inherent intricacy of white-collar crime on three different 
levels means that defendants’ lawyers cannot investigate these crimes 
without spending a great deal of time, which translates into a great 
deal of money, sorting out the legal, factual, and intent issues. As Part 
II explains, the complexity of these issues not only raises the price of 
defending corporate crime, it significantly differentiates white-collar 
criminal defendants from typical street-crime defendants. 
II.  DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CORPORATE AND STREET CRIME 
Some commentators have pointed to the similarities and 
differences between the prosecution of corporate and street crime to 
argue that the coercion is no worse, and reform is no more necessary, 
in the former than in the latter.49 Street-crime defendants do face a 
great deal of pressure and relative lack of bargaining power when 
submitting to plea agreements to maintain their freedom, and Fifth 
 
 45. See, e.g., Karen Richardson, ‘‘Lies’’ or ‘‘Doubt’’: GenRe-AIG Trial Begins as Both Sides 
Lay Groundwork—Former Executives Accused of Fraud in Reinsurance, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 
2008, at C2 (“Reid Weingarten, lawyer for former General Re executive Elizabeth Monrad, said 
Joseph Brandon, the current CEO of General Re, who isn’t charged, was ‘all over this 
transaction.’ Mr. Weingarten also said Warren Buffett knew about the transaction and that, as 
such, Ms. Monrad ‘never in a million years would have thought the transaction would be 
shady.’”). 
 46. Buell, supra note 27, at 1628. 
 47. Hasnas, supra note 32, at 1270. 
 48. In some corporate-crime cases, obstruction of justice and perjury charges are the only 
ones that end up sticking. Griffin, supra note 28, at 333 & n.116 (“Consider the case of Bruce G. 
Hill, the general counsel of a small Boston-based software company, Inso Corp., who was 
convicted on only one of two perjury charges for a false exculpatory statement but was found 
not guilty of the securities and wire fraud charges that had prompted the investigation in the 
first place. Similarly, in a case in which four Merrill Lynch employees had been charged with 
aiding Enron’s fraudulent accounting, the Fifth Circuit tossed out all of the conspiracy and wire 
fraud counts and left standing only the perjury and obstruction counts against a single Merrill 
Lynch defendant.” (citation omitted)). 
 49. See Sara Sun Beale, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Unique?, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1503, 1503 (2007) (“[T]he problems highlighted by the critics of corporate and white collar 
liability are often most severe in other contexts . . . .”); Buell, supra note 27, at 1617 (arguing 
that examining the differences between ordinary and corporate crime “reduces worry” about 
the government’s treatment of white-collar defendants). 
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Amendment jurisprudence does not protect these defendants from all 
such coercion.50 The pressures on street-crime defendants are 
significant and problematic, and policymakers should not necessarily 
ignore those problems in favor of reforming the white-collar criminal 
procedure.51 Two principal differences between corporate and street 
crime distinguish the type and the level of coercion individual white-
collar defendants face, however, presenting them with a different 
dilemma—that is, the choice between pleading guilty and being 
unable to afford to defend themselves at all. 
A. Differences in Legal, Factual, and Intent Inquiries 
The difficult legal, factual, and intent inquiries in white-collar 
crime cases that raise the costs of these defenses52 are significantly 
different from the inquiries usually involved in traditional criminal 
cases. Because white-collar cases are so much more complex, it is less 
clear whether defendants have committed crimes. Prosecutors thus 
enjoy greater discretion to determine whether and how to charge 
white-collar cases. Prosecutors’ increased discretion can give the 
government even greater bargaining power over alleged white-collar 
criminals than over alleged street criminals. This power leads to a 
much higher risk of pressure on defendants to plead guilty to white 
collar–crime allegations than the typical street-crime defendant faces. 
First, the complex legal standards involved in prosecuting 
corporate crime53 create a very different “legal landscape”54 from the 
one on which street-crime cases are prosecuted. In traditional 
criminal cases the standards for criminality are usually much better 
defined; for instance, everyone can agree that possessing cocaine is 
illegal, whereas complicated accounting decisions involve questions of 
criminality that courts may have never even addressed before and 
 
 50. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970) (“Although Brady’s plea of guilty may 
well have been motivated in part by a desire to avoid a possible death penalty, we are convinced 
that his plea was voluntarily and intelligently made and we have no reason to doubt that his 
solemn admission of guilt was truthful.”). 
 51. See Beale, supra note 49, at 1535 (“While these problems exist in the context of 
corporate and white collar prosecutions, it would be a mistake to overlook the need for review 
and reform of the greater criminal system.”). 
 52. See supra Part I. 
 53. See supra Part I. 
 54. Buell, supra note 27, at 1617. 
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that can be nearly inscrutable to those lacking accounting expertise.55 
Prosecutors have little difficulty deciding whether a homicide was a 
crime. In contrast, “in complex organizational settings, the 
wrongdoing can be deeply nested within legitimate and valuable 
economic activity.”56 Prosecutors in street-crime cases have a great 
deal of discretion as to whether or not to indict, but they do not 
usually have the discretion to prosecute behavior that is arguably not 
a crime at all.57 This greater discretion in white-collar cases leads to a 
greater risk of prosecuting noncriminal activity and therefore of 
pressuring noncriminals to plead guilty. 
Second, factual questions are much more difficult to answer in 
the midst of the complicated internal workings of a corporation than 
on the street.58 The factual questions surrounding traditional criminal 
activity do not involve untangling complex organizations or 
corporations’ extensive paper trails. Unlike in traditional crime, the 
allegedly illegal activity in corporate crime is often committed by 
many layers of employees, and the questions of what activity 
occurred, whose activity was illegal, and to whom the activity can be 
attributed are not necessarily clearly answered even after sorting 
through reams of evidence.59 The difficulty in answering these 
questions might create greater opportunities for mistakes in 
corporate-crime prosecutions than in street-crime prosecutions; for 
instance, prosecutors (possibly with the help of dissembling 
employees covering their tracks and shifting blame) might attribute 
the conduct in question to the wrong one of many possible players in 
the multilayer organization. Factual mistakes and evidentiary 
uncertainty may be more likely to favor the prosecution in white-
collar cases than in street-crime cases because white-collar defendants 
 
 55. See id. at 1627 (noting that it is much easier to determine whether a crime has occurred 
when the allegation is murder than when it is fraud). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. at 1628 (“The state makes decisions case by case . . . about what to treat as a 
crime and what to leave for civil regulation.”). 
 58. The difference between street and corporate crime could be considered the difference 
between a puzzle, which “grows simpler with the addition of each new piece of information,” 
and a mystery, which requires sorting through and making sense of “too much information” to 
answer a question that may not have a “simple, factual answer.” Malcolm Gladwell, Open 
Secrets: Enron, Intelligence, and the Perils of Too Much Information, NEW YORKER, Jan. 8, 
2007, at 44, 49. 
 59. See Darryl K. Brown, The Problematic and Faintly Promising Dynamics of Corporate 
Crime Enforcement, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 526 (2004) (“Corporate wrongdoing is less 
visible and harder to detect than most street crime.”). 
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have a greater resource disadvantage, pressuring them to plead guilty 
when they cannot afford to defend against the allegations. 
Finally, answering questions of intent is easier in the street-
criminal context than in corporate crime. Whereas mens rea is usually 
a relatively straightforward question of “knowledge” or “purpose” in 
traditional criminal cases, white-collar crime cases raise more difficult 
intent issues; mens rea can include additional layers such as 
“willfulness,” “bad purpose,” “consciousness of wrongdoing,” and an 
increased focus on mistake of law.60 In addition, accused white-collar 
criminals can often contend that they did not know that their conduct 
was anything but business as usual, especially if a more senior 
employee authorized it61 or they arguably believed it was a commonly 
accepted business practice, such as backdating.62 This “searching 
inquiry into mental state”63 creates yet another way in which 
prosecutors have greater flexibility to determine culpability in white-
collar cases than they do in street-crime cases. 
B. Government Pressure on Employers 
White-collar defendants face additional pressure from their 
employers, who control a source of funds for their defense. 
Traditional criminal defendants who cannot afford to defend 
themselves are provided with counsel according to the Sixth 
Amendment64 and the Criminal Justice Act (CJA).65 It would seem 
that well-off white-collar defendants backed by multibillion dollar 
corporations could only be in a better position than indigent street-
crime defendants, but in one way at least, they are caught in a difficult 
 
 60. Buell, supra note 27, at 1628. 
 61. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 62. Edward Iwata, Pay Analyst Testifies Grants ‘‘Seemed Odd’’ in Brocade Backdating 
Case, USA TODAY, June 19, 2007, at 7B (“Defense attorney Richard Marmaro told jurors that 
backdating was ‘a common business practice in America’ . . . . In recent years, he said, Brocade 
issued backdated grants to more than 1,000 employees to recruit top talent.”); see also United 
States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 524–26 (5th Cir. 2006) (describing the many documents the 
government attempted to use to prove the defendant’s knowledge and specific intent to defraud 
and concluding that these documents did not prove the sufficient level of intent). 
 63. Buell, supra note 27, at 1628. 
 64. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341–45 (1963) 
(extending the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel to the states). 
 65. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (2006) (“Each United States district court, with the approval of 
the judicial council of the circuit, shall place in operation throughout the district a plan for 
furnishing representation for any person financially unable to obtain adequate representation in 
accordance with this section.”). 
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situation in which the criminal justice system protections are not 
available to them. Despite white-collar defendants’ relative wealth, 
often the only ones willing and able to pay their attorneys are their 
employers, because very few individual defendants can actually afford 
to fully defend a white-collar criminal case.66 The government, 
however, has a unique ability to prevent white-collar defendants from 
being able to fully fund their defenses by pressuring their employers 
not to pay these fees. 
When prosecuting corporate crime cases, the DOJ has 
historically considered a corporation’s payment of its employees’ 
attorneys’ fees when deciding whether or not to indict the firm,67 and 
firms under threat of indictment have often given in to pressure to cut 
off indemnification of their employees.68 At the time of the events 
precipitating the United States v. Stein decisions,69 the Thompson 
Memorandum70 provided guidelines for the DOJ in its decisions to 
indict corporations.71 It explicitly suggested that prosecutors use a 
corporation’s payment of its employees’ defense costs as one of 
several indications of the corporation’s cooperation in the 
 
 66. Urgenson & Harris, supra note 18, at 2; see also United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F. 
Supp. 2d 390, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“This is not to say that the Constitution guarantees anyone 
charged with a crime representation by a ‘Dream Team’ or a multimillion dollar defense. But, as 
Stein I held, it does guarantee those who can afford it the right to spend their money for the best 
(or, what is not always the same thing, the most expensive) defense that money can buy, free of 
unjustified interference by the government. It also, as a general matter, prevents the 
government from interfering if a criminal defendant is fortunate enough to have someone who 
is willing to give the defendant the money to pay for a defense, even a very expensive one. The 
vice of the government’s actions here was that the government improperly interfered with the 
payment of defense costs that KPMG otherwise would have paid . . . .”); Podgor, supra note 20, 
at 751 n.123 (“News reports suggested that Enron’s former chief accounting officer Richard 
Causey’s plea was motivated by the cost of attorney fees . . . .”). 
 67. The government tends to focus on the corporation’s cooperation when making its 
charging decisions. Until the change from the Thompson to the McNulty Memorandum, 
prosecutors treated a refusal to pay employees’ attorneys’ fees as one element of cooperation. 
Elston, supra note 33, at 1436. 
 68. See, e.g., Davies & Reilly, supra note 4 (discussing the fee cutoff in both the Olis and 
Stein trials). 
 69. The Stein litigation has prompted a number of decisions. United States v. Stein (Stein 
I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); United States v. Stein (Stein II), 440 F. Supp. 2d. 315 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); United States v. Stein (Stein III), 452 F. Supp. 2d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Stein 
IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 390; United States v. Stein (Stein V), 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 70. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Att’ys pt. VI.B (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson 
Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm. 
 71. Id. 
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investigation.72 Eventually, the Thompson Memorandum was 
replaced by the McNulty Memorandum, which changed the 
guidelines slightly: it prohibited the DOJ from considering payment 
of defense costs as a measure of cooperation except in “rare cases.”73 
That change, however, was widely agreed to have little or no effect on 
the amount of pressure on corporations: the DOJ did not have to 
disclose its reasons for deciding whether to indict, and corporations 
would still want to signal the utmost cooperation by cutting off their 
employees’ legal fees.74 
Ultimately, the Filip Memorandum replaced the McNulty 
Memorandum. This new version of the guidelines may appear to have 
resolved the issue by flatly prohibiting the DOJ from considering 
attorneys’ fees in its charging decisions.75 But for the same reasons 
that the McNulty Memorandum’s changes to DOJ policy were 
probably ineffectual in reducing pressure on corporations, the Filip 
Memorandum will also probably not solve the problem—the 
government is still not required to disclose what it considered when 
deciding how to charge, and incentives that create a likelihood of 
perceived pressure remain. The same broad prosecutorial discretion 
that pressures individual defendants to plead guilty can create even 
greater pressure on corporations because indictment sometimes 
threatens a firm’s very existence,76 giving employers strong incentives 
to surrender to any perceived government pressure to cut off 
advancement of employees’ defense costs. As the U.S. Attorney said 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 24, at 11 n.3. 
 74. See, e.g., Bharara, supra note 26, at 78–79 (observing that, “in most important respects,” 
the provisions of the Thompson and McNulty memoranda that concern how the government 
assesses the culpability of corporations and considers its own source of authority and leverage, 
“the new [McNulty] guidelines are identical to the [Thompson] guidelines [they] replaced”); 
John Power, Note, Show Me the Money: The Thompson Memo, Stein, and an Employee’s Right 
to the Advancement of Legal Fees Under the McNulty Memo, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1205, 
1235 (2007) (“[W]hile the McNulty memo aims to limit the circumstances under which 
advancement [of an employee’s legal fees] may be considered by prosecutors, consideration 
about advancement may remain, albeit pushed to an unspoken, underground level.”). 
 75. Filip Memorandum, supra note 25, at 13. 
 76. See, e.g., Barry A. Bohrer & Barbara L. Trencher, Prosecution Deferred: Exploring the 
Unintended Consequences and Future of Corporate Cooperation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 
1483 (2007) (“[W]hat matters is that upon the mere announcement of an indictment, a 
corporation is effectively punished as if a guilty verdict had been returned.”). The pressure on 
corporations described here tends to apply largely to certain types of firms whose reputation or 
ability to secure clients will be most affected by an indictment. Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. 
McConnell, Annual Corporate Pre-Trial Agreement Update – 2007, at 4–5 (Mar. 2008) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
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about KPMG’s cooperation with the investigation during negotiations 
over a deferred prosecution agreement, “Let me put it this way, I’ve 
seen a lot better from big companies.”77 Whether or not prosecutors 
faithfully put all knowledge of the corporation’s fee payment policy 
out of their minds when making charging decisions, corporations 
know that their every action might affect the decision. 
Therefore, despite language to the contrary in the Filip 
Memorandum, corporations may deem it necessary to refuse to 
advance their employees’ defense costs to avoid indictment, 
especially if other corporations under investigation are willing to cut 
off advancement of fees, potentially creating a feedback loop in which 
no corporation will risk paying its employees’ fees. Further enhancing 
prosecutorial discretion, courts have continually broadened the scope 
of criminal corporate liability such that almost any conduct by any 
employee can lead to a finding of liability of the firm under the 
respondeat superior and “collective knowledge” doctrines.78 Thus, 
corporations are in a tenuous position with extremely little bargaining 
power and will scramble to cooperate with the government to secure 
deferred (or non-) prosecution agreements.79 Further, although 
corporations use indemnification and advancement agreements to 
attract employees, they have the financial incentive to place some 
limits on these agreements.80 Whether or not the government does 
anything to induce a corporation to cut off its employees’ fees, the 
corporation could decide on its own not to fund an employee’s 
defense past a certain point. Whatever the reason, the employee is 
left effectively defenseless and pressured to plead guilty. 
Traditional street-crime defendants face well-documented 
pressure to plead guilty, and the Fifth Amendment does not fully 
protect them from this pressure.81 They face broad prosecutorial 
discretion, a lack of bargaining power, significantly greater sentences 
 
 77. United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting 
David N. Kelley, United States Attorney, Southern District of New York). 
 78. See George J. Terwilliger III, Under-Breaded Shrimp and Other High Crimes: 
Addressing the Over-Criminalization of Commercial Regulation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 
1421–28 (2007) (describing the Supreme Court’s expansion of corporate criminal liability). 
 79. See Griffin, supra note 28, at 327 (“Because virtually no company will risk indictment, 
prosecutors have come to expect compliance with every government demand.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Tafeen v. Homestore, Inc., No. CIVA. 023-N, 2004 WL 556733, at *10 (Del. 
Ch. 2004) (acknowledging the financial risk placed on companies by unlimited advancements 
but rejecting that risk as a basis for nonenforcement of a contract), aff’d, 888 A.2d 204 (Del. 
2005). 
 81. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970). 
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if they lose at trial than if they agree to a plea bargain, and often the 
damning testimony of codefendants who have cut a deal with the 
government. White-collar defendants, however, face similar pressures 
with the additional wrinkle of their extremely high defense costs: they 
may find the option of going to trial almost completely infeasible due 
to their lack of resources if their employers do not pay their defense 
costs. The contention that white-collar criminals face a different kind 
of pressure does not suggest that the traditional criminal justice 
system is not also in serious need of reform. Rather, it illustrates that 
white-collar defendants are subject to a different dilemma that is, in 
some ways, more problematic than the one street-crime defendants 
face. 
III.  APPROACHES TO ALLEVIATING THE PRESSURE 
Pressure on white-collar criminal defendants is a problem, then, 
but what is the solution? One possibility would be to prevent the 
pressure before it begins by ensuring that white-collar defendants are 
adequately indemnified for their legal fees; if their employers could 
not withdraw financial support from their employees, defendants 
would have the resources to fully defend themselves at trial and 
would not feel coerced into pleading guilty. A second type of solution 
is constitutional protection, which Judge Kaplan and the Second 
Circuit have found covers at least some instances of prosecutorial 
influence on corporate employers; under this approach, defendants’ 
broadly defined procedural rights would limit prosecutors’ power. 
Third, prosecutorial guidelines, ethical rules, or legislation could 
regulate prosecutorial conduct directly. This Part examines each 
approach and concludes that inherent procedural aspects of white-
collar prosecutions make each solution infeasible or ineffective. 
A. Indemnification Agreements 
Although firms commonly agree to indemnify their employees 
for their legal fees, corporate employees cannot necessarily rely on 
their employers to protect them from the difficult choice between 
pleading guilty and mounting a defense they are unable to afford. The 
DOJ policy, as outlined in the Filip Memorandum, ostensibly 
prevents the government’s consideration of preexisting 
indemnification provisions when assessing a firm’s cooperation,82 but 
 
 82. Filip Memorandum, supra note 25, at 13. 
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employers could still feel intense pressure to cut off fee advancement 
for the reasons Part II.B discussed. Violations of the DOJ policy are 
difficult to detect83 and to enforce.84 Further, employers face their own 
financial pressure to cut off indemnification and advancement at 
some point; they may not want to risk providing limitless defense 
funds to an employee who could later be convicted or found to have 
acted in bad faith.85 Thus, some pressure to cut off indemnification 
likely remains, despite the changed guidelines. 
Given that firms likely still face pressure to stop paying their 
employees’ legal costs, will they do so despite having contracted to 
advance their employees’ fees? Employers often agree to indemnify 
their employees and advance fees beyond the legal minimum.86 They 
have an incentive to offer generous indemnification and advancement 
provisions to attract talent and encourage some risk taking from 
employees who fear bankruptcy or being unable to pay for their 
defense if their behavior is later alleged to be criminal.87 Most states 
have indemnification statutes that allow various levels of contractual 
indemnification and often require some level of indemnification, but 
these statutes usually only require reimbursement of fees after a 
successful defense.88 Because defendants usually cannot afford to pay 
 
 83. See infra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 84. Filip Memorandum, supra note 25, at 21. 
 85. See, e.g., Levy v. Hayes Lemmerz Int’l, Inc., Civ. A. No. 1395-N, 2006 WL 985361, at 
*10 (Del. Ch. 2006) (rejecting a corporation’s argument that the court should stay an 
indemnification action until an SEC investigation concluded whether the former directors acted 
in bad faith). 
 86. The court found that California statutes applicable to some of the KPMG defendants 
required that they be advanced costs if the costs were related to the defendants’ employment 
and that they be indemnified unless their actions were “unlawful and ‘believed to be unlawful’ 
at the time.” United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 356 n.119 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 2802(a) (West 2006); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2778 (West 2006)). The 
applicable Delaware law allows partnerships to indemnify their partners as set forth in the 
partnership agreements. Id. at 355 n.117 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-110 (2006)). 
 87. See Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. 2005) (“Indemnification 
encourages corporate service by capable individuals by protecting their personal financial 
resources from depletion by the expenses they incur during an investigation or litigation that 
results by reason of that service. . . . Advancement is an especially important corollary to 
indemnification as an inducement for attracting capable individuals into corporate service.”). 
 88. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (2006) (“To the extent that a person or 
former director or officer of a corporation has been successful on the merits or otherwise in 
defense of any action . . . such person shall be indemnified against expenses (including 
attorney’s fees) actually and reasonably incurred by such person in connection therewith.”); see 
also Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 354–55 (observing that “[t]oday, all states have statutes 
addressing the indemnification of corporate directors, officers, employees, and other agents” 
and describing those statutes). 
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for their defenses out of pocket during the investigation and trial, 
most states also allow firms to advance fees during litigation.89 
Firms often have flexibility in determining the terms of their fee 
advancements to employees, so they have the option of drafting 
agreements that cut off the payment of fees at some point.90 A finite 
advancement agreement can leave an employee in the same position 
as if the government had pressured the corporation to cut off defense 
fees: the individual defendant is still left unable to adequately defend 
against the likely complex charges. And even with the most generous 
possible advancement agreement, employers have strong incentives 
to cut off fees and risk their employees suing them for breach of 
contract.91 Suing an employer when criminal charges are pending 
might be too inconvenient for the employees, so the risk of suit might 
not be that significant. In any case, though, lawsuits take time, and 
after waiting for the uncertain outcome of a lawsuit, it may be too late 
for an employee to pay for a proper defense without being sure of 
reimbursement. Therefore defendants may not see suing their 
employers for their attorneys’ fees as a viable option and may feel 
forced to forego a full defense because they lack the resources. Even 
if defendants do choose to go to trial (likely with inferior counsel) and 
later sue for reimbursement, the threat to the firm of such a suit may 
in many cases pale in comparison to the threat of being charged with 
criminal misconduct, because the latter could destroy the 
corporation.92 If in practice firms are willing to breach an 
indemnification agreement in response to perceived government 
pressure, they will likely continue to do so to save the corporation. 
Even if employers are later found responsible for their employees’ 
attorneys’ fees, it may be too late for the employees to fully defend 
 
 89. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (“Expenses (including attorney’s fees) 
incurred by an officer or director in defending any civil, criminal, administrative or investigative 
action, suit or proceeding may be paid by the corporation in advance of the final disposition of 
such action . . . .”); see also Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 355 (“[M]any states authorize business 
entities to advance defense costs to their personnel . . . .”). 
 90. See, e.g., Adobe Systems Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), ex. 3.1, art. XI, § 43(c) 
(Sept. 23, 2005) (Amended & Restated Bylaws), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/796343/000110465905045524/a05-16703_1ex3d1.htm (limiting fee advancement when 
the board of directors determines that the officer or director acted in bad faith or against the 
corporation’s interests). 
 91. See supra notes 80, 85 and accompanying text; infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 92. See supra Part II.B. 
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themselves by the time they are reimbursed.93 Therefore, 
indemnification and advancement provisions cannot reliably lift the 
financial pressure on individual defendants. 
B. Constitutional Protections 
When legal procedures are unfair, it might seem logical to look 
to the Constitution to prevent injustice. In fact, two courts have 
invoked constitutional safeguards to protect white-collar defendants 
from the pressure their high defense costs create.94 But others have 
argued that courts cannot stretch these constitutional doctrines to 
apply to the type of coercion that arises from the cost of defending 
corporate crime.95 And even if the Constitution can, in theory, protect 
white-collar defendants from the pressure this Note describes, 
applying its protections might, in practice, be impossible. This Section 
outlines the doctrinal and practical problems associated with using 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to protect individual white-collar 
defendants from financial pressure to plead guilty and concludes that 
neither amendment can fully protect them. 
1. The Sixth Amendment.  In Stein, the district and appellate 
courts both held that the Sixth Amendment protected the defendants 
from the conduct of the DOJ in its prosecution of KPMG.96 Sixth 
Amendment doctrine fits poorly, however, with the type of pressure 
that white-collar defendants face because of their high defense costs, 
and even if it applied doctrinally, it could be prohibitively impractical 
to implement its protections. 
 a. Doctrinal Issues.  Despite the holdings in Stein that the Sixth 
Amendment protected against the DOJ’s conduct when it prosecuted 
 
 93. See Posting of Peter Lattman, supra note 11 (“[A] Texas jury ruled that Dynegy 
improperly cut [Olis] off in a bid to avoid a criminal indictment of the energy company [four 
years ago]. The jury ordered Dynegy to pay Olis’s attorney Terry Yates, who brought the case, 
$2.5 million in damages. The company plans to appeal. For Olis, 41 years old, the decision was a 
hollow victory.”). 
 94. United States v. Stein (Stein V), 541 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Stein 
(Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 95. See Margulies, supra note 27 (arguing that Stein III’s application of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments “make[s] it a dangerous precedent that will increase agency costs and moral 
hazard for owners of business organizations, and reduce the government’s ability to combat 
stonewalling of investigations that is disfavored under both the legal ethics rules and substantive 
law”). 
 96. Stein V, 541 F.3d at 136; Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 367–69. 
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KPMG,97 those courts arguably misapplied the doctrine to cover the 
facts of that case,98 and future cases will be even harder to fit into a 
Sixth Amendment rubric. 
First, a corporation’s usual practice of advancing attorneys’ fees 
to its employees does not necessarily make those advancements the 
defendants’ own resources, which the Sixth Amendment requires, 
such that government interference with fee advancements amounts to 
interference with defendants’ choice of counsel.99 The cases relied on 
in United States v. Stein (Stein I)100 for the holding that the government 
improperly interfered with defendants’ choice of counsel could also 
stand for the proposition that defendants do not have an absolute 
right to their choice of counsel. In Wheat v. United States,101 the 
Supreme Court held that a trial court could reject the defendant’s 
counsel of choice due to a “serious potential for conflict[s of 
interest],”102 and in Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States103 
the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to prevent the defendant 
from using funds he allegedly earned through illegal drug 
trafficking.104 Unlike the right to the effective assistance of counsel, 
“which is an irreducible minimum under the Sixth Amendment,” 
defendants’ rights to choose their own counsel is not “absolute”105 and 
courts arguably should limit it when it may severely hamper a 
criminal prosecution or when defendants attempt to use allegedly ill-
gotten funds (here, from their alleged corporate misdeeds) for their 
defense. In addition, future cases will likely present a different 
situation—one in which the corporation has explicitly contracted to 
 
 97. See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 366 (“It protects, among other things, an individual’s 
right to choose the lawyer or lawyers he or she desires and to use one’s own funds to mount the 
defense that one wishes to present.” (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164 (1988); 
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989))). 
 98. See Margulies, supra note 27 (“[T]he court’s legal holdings are difficult to support. 
While the court asserted that the defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to advancement of 
legal fees, precedent holds only that the defendant has a right to ‘spend his own money’ to 
secure counsel.” (emphasis added) (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 626)). 
 99. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 619. 
 100. United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 101. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988). 
 102. Id. at 164. 
 103. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989). 
 104. Id. at 632. 
 105. Brief for the United States of America at 56, United States v. Stein (Stein V), 541 F.3d 
130 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-3042) (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2561 
(2006)). 
RIBSTEIN IN FINAL.DOC 2/10/2009  12:03:30 PM 
878 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:857 
advance an employee’s attorneys’ fees,106 making it less likely that a 
court will find that the resources do not belong to the employee. 
Second, violations of the Sixth Amendment must be perpetrated 
by the government or by action attributable to the government.107 But 
the government likely is not demonstrably responsible when it is 
ultimately the corporation that has directly impeded the defendants’ 
ability to retain adequate counsel. Under the Filip Memorandum, 
which prohibits the outright consideration of attorneys’ fees, it will be 
even harder than it was in Stein to demonstrate that government 
action caused interference with defense counsel because the decision 
to cut off fees will be even less attributable to the government and 
more to the corporation. Given that “scholars who seek to constrain 
the private exercise of authority through the extension of 
constitutional limits to nonstate actors face an uphill battle,”108 a 
finding of state action will be hard to justify doctrinally when the 
government will presumably avoid the appearance that it is 
considering attorneys’ fees at all. In fact, the corporation could be 
acting solely on its own to cut off its employees’ fees, possibly based 
on its own determination that its employees have committed 
wrongdoing or based on internal financial pressure,109 in which case 
the individual defendant is left without a constitutional remedy. 
 b. Practical Problems.  Even if courts follow the Stein courts’ 
reasoning and continue to find state action despite the change in DOJ 
guidelines, they may have trouble delineating the extent of these 
Sixth Amendment protections. Applying the Sixth Amendment to 
indirect pressure on white-collar defendants creates a variety of 
 
 106. See Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 218 (Del. 2005) (“[M]ost Delaware 
corporations do adopt advancement provisions as an inducement . . . [to] attract[] the most 
capable people into corporate service.”). 
 107. Thompson v. Mississippi, 914 F.2d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that although the 
sheriff’s department permitted an accidental run-in between a witness and defendant, there was 
no state action because the run-in “was not authorized, arranged, or requested by” the 
government). 
 108. Griffin, supra note 28, at 365 (referring to the state’s practice of obtaining incriminating 
statements through private actors). 
 109. See, e.g., DeLucca v. KKAT Mgmt., L.L.C., Civ.A. No. 1384-N, 2006 WL 224058, at *2 
(Del. Ch. 2006) (rejecting a company’s attempt to interpret its indemnification and 
advancement provisions narrowly when the company sued a former employee for breaches of 
fiduciary and contractual obligations); Tafeen v. Homestore, Inc., No. CIVA. 023-N, 2004 WL 
556733, at *10 (Del. Ch. 2004) (rejecting the corporation’s argument that the provision in its 
bylaws for advancing fees to a former officer should not be enforced because of the financial 
strain it would place on the corporation), aff’d, 888 A.2d 204 (Del. 2005). 
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practical problems: given these defendants’ inevitable high defense 
costs, the questions of who will pay the costs and how they will be 
paid will be difficult to answer. 
In traditional criminal cases, the government can and does pay to 
provide indigent defendants with adequate representation,110 easily 
solving Sixth Amendment problems that arise from a lack of defense 
funds. In corporate criminal cases, on the other hand, many 
defendants have enough money that they are likely not eligible for 
public defenders unless they first spend all of their resources on their 
defense.111 Even very wealthy white-collar defendants often cannot 
afford the level of representation necessary to fully defend the types 
of charges they face.112 In any case, the government simply could not 
afford to cover the defendants’ costs to the extent necessary to 
provide them the defense they would otherwise choose; a government 
defender would not have nearly the same expertise or resources as 
the expensive defense counsel that an employer would fund.113 The 
remedy for a Sixth Amendment violation is to restore defendants to 
the position they occupied before the government interfered with 
their choice of counsel, which in some cases could arguably be 
achieved by appointing counsel under the CJA.114 This is likely 
impossible in corporate criminal prosecutions, however, because 
defendants would have to spend all of their money to become eligible 
for a CJA lawyer, and they still would not get their counsel of 
 
 110. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (2006) (“Each United States district court, with the approval 
of the judicial council of the circuit, shall place in operation throughout the district a plan for 
furnishing representation for any person financially unable to obtain adequate representation in 
accordance with this section.”). 
 111. See, e.g., United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(noting that under the CJA plan for the Southern District of New York, “the retention of assets 
in excess of those essential to provide ‘the necessities of life’ would be disqualifying”). 
 112. See id. at 423 (discussing the financial states of the defendants and concluding that 
“[n]one of them can afford to defend this case at any meaningful level”). In Stein IV, the 
government conceded that an estimate of $3.3 million in defense fees for one defendant was 
“very conservative,” and other lawyers estimated that the cost could be between $7 and $24 
million. Id. at 424. 
 113. Id. at 419. 
 114. See id. at 419–21 (finding that, in that case, a CJA appointment could not restore 
defendants to their original positions because they would have had to “spend down” their 
resources to qualify and the CJA attorney would have been limited by a maximum fee that was 
much less than what KPMG would have paid); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (“Each United 
States district court, with the approval of the judicial council of the circuit, shall place in 
operation throughout the district a plan for furnishing representation for any person financially 
unable to obtain adequate representation in accordance with this section.”). 
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choice.115 Therefore, for instance, in United States v. Stein (Stein IV)116 
the government conceded that dismissal was the only possible remedy 
for most of the defendants given the finding that the government had 
violated their Sixth Amendment rights.117 Dismissing all prosecutions 
in which employers do not pay defendants’ legal fees could 
significantly frustrate prosecuting white-collar crime. 
Even if courts decide that the government must provide some 
portion of a white-collar defendant’s costs, or provide some type of 
representation, it would be difficult to determine how much the 
government must pay or how skilled a public defender must be to be 
constitutionally adequate. For white-collar defendants who are 
eligible for public defenders, requiring the government to pay 
significantly more for white-collar defenses than the $7,000 the CJA 
allots118 would raise serious issues of unfairness and inequality, and 
$7,000 would make an insignificant dent in the typical cost of 
defending the types of allegations involved.119 
2. The Fifth Amendment 
 a. Doctrinal Problems.  The Stein I court also held that the 
government’s actions toward KPMG violated the individual 
defendants’ Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights to 
“obtain and use in order to prepare a defense resources lawfully 
available to him or her, free of knowing or reckless government 
interference.”120 The court found this right to be a fundamental 
substantive due process right, subject to strict scrutiny, and further 
found that the Thompson Memorandum and the actions of the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office were not narrowly tailored to a compelling 
governmental interest.121 In Stein IV, the court found that the 
government’s conduct, “us[ing] KPMG to strip any of its employees 
who were indicted of means of defending themselves,” “shocked the 
 
 115. Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 421–22. 
 116. United States v. Stein (Stein IV), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 117. Id. at 425. 
 118. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(2). 
 119. See Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 424 (presenting estimates of one defendant’s total fees 
ranging between $3.3 and $24 million). 
 120. United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 361–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The 
Second Circuit did not reach the Fifth Amendment question on appeal. United States v. Stein 
(Stein V), 541 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 121. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 364–65. 
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conscience” and thereby violated the defendants’ substantive due 
process rights.122 
Judge Kaplan’s constitutional analysis includes some possible 
doctrine infirmities. First, although the court in Stein I referenced 
many cases in which courts upheld the rights to various aspects of fair 
procedure, it did not cite any cases finding that defendants have the 
right to use someone else’s funds to pay for their defenses.123 In 
addition, the court acknowledged that the Supreme Court had not 
previously found even the broader “right to fairness in the criminal 
process” to be a fundamental right.124 Thus the court declared an 
arguably new fundamental right of a criminal defendant “to obtain 
and use in order to prepare a defense resources lawfully available to 
him or her.”125 Bolstering the argument that this right was not 
previously considered to be fundamental, the Supreme Court in 
Caplin & Drysdale had addressed a question of using available funds 
to pay for a defense without declaring that the question involved a 
fundamental right or applying strict scrutiny.126 If the right to use 
available resources in one’s defense is not a fundamental right, it is 
not subject to strict scrutiny and would likely pass the less stringent 
rational basis test because of the government’s interest in preventing 
corporations from protecting culpable employees.127 
Second, the court’s finding that the prosecution’s behavior met 
the “shocks the conscience” standard is questionable. The standard is 
not easy to delineate, but it is arguably not met when a prosecutor 
pressures a corporation to withhold its employees’ legal fees.128 In the 
past, courts have often required a much higher level of coercion to 
find a violation of substantive due process rights, including 
 
 122. Stein IV, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 415. 
 123. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 357–59. 
 124. Id. at 360. 
 125. Id. at 360–62. 
 126. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 619 (1989) (“We are 
called on to determine whether the federal drug forfeiture statute includes an exemption for 
assets that a defendant wishes to use to pay an attorney who conducted his defense in the 
criminal case where forfeiture was sought. Because we determine that no such exemption exists, 
we must decide whether that statute, so interpreted, is consistent with the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments.”). 
 127. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (holding that the assisted suicide 
ban was not a fundamental interest and “unquestionably” met the rational basis requirement for 
validity). 
 128. See Margulies, supra note 27 (arguing that more is usually required for a finding of a 
substantive due process violation of the right to fairness in a criminal proceeding). 
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involuntary stomach pumping,129 using a defendant’s own lawyer 
against him,130 and hiding a criminal investigation to collect evidence 
and avoid constitutional protections.131 In KPMG’s case, the 
government’s actions were nearly imperceptible; the government 
made only subtle references to attorneys’ fees during negotiations132 
and followed a policy (in the Thompson Memorandum) that included 
payment of attorneys’ fees as one factor among many to consider in 
indictment decisions.133 In the future, under the Filip Memorandum, 
the DOJ is unlikely to exhibit any outward signs of pressure at all 
because the policy explicitly forbids it to consider attorneys’ fees.134 
The government may even have nothing to do with an employer’s 
decision to cut off fees; in such cases, the individual defendants would 
still be left without defense funds and would still feel pressure to 
plead guilty, but the lack of state action would leave them without 
recourse to the Fifth Amendment. 
 b. Practical Problems.  Even if courts agree with the Stein court 
that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause protects against 
government pressure on employers to cut off advancement of fees,135 
the question remains how this protection would apply in practice. 
Because corporate crime is so difficult to investigate, prosecutors 
often need a defendant corporation’s help to sort through its 
complicated inner workings.136 The corporation could, in some cases, 
be interfering with the government’s prosecution by advancing its 
employees’ attorneys’ fees to help protect culpable employees by 
“circling the wagons.”137 Applying the Fifth Amendment could also 
create spillover problems in other instances of potential coercion. The 
Fifth Amendment could, for example, prevent the government from 
using other methods of obtaining corporations’ cooperation, such as 
 
 129. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 209–10 (1952). 
 130. United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507, 1523 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
 131. United States v. Stringer, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1088–89 (D. Or. 2006). 
 132. United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 133. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 72, pt. V1.B. 
 134. Filip Memorandum, supra note 25, at 13. 
 135. Extending the Fifth Amendment to cover government pressure on employers to cut off 
advancement of legal fees to employees is unlikely if most courts follow the Supreme Court’s 
lead and generally protect the government’s prosecutorial power. See Bharara, supra note 26, at 
104–05 (“Stein is in spirit at odds with a century of utilitarian Supreme Court decisions mostly 
deferential to law enforcement.”). 
 136. See supra Part I; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 137. Margulies, supra note 27. 
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encouraging employee testimony, that are arguably necessary for 
prosecuting white-collar crimes.138 
It will also be extremely difficult to prove when the government 
is acting coercively. In KPMG’s case, the payment of attorneys’ fees 
was expressly a consideration in the Thompson Memorandum and 
the prosecutors did make references, albeit oblique ones, to 
attorneys’ fees in negotiations with KPMG.139 The Filip 
Memorandum, however, will prevent the DOJ from outright 
considering payment of fees, meaning that it will be much harder to 
show when the government’s actions caused employers to cut off their 
employees’ fees. In fact, the government does not have to act at all for 
employers to feel pressure to cut off fees: firms often have the 
incentive to do so whether or not the government has actively 
pressured them, either to avoid indictment or for reasons having 
nothing to do with government action.140 
C. Prosecutorial Regulation 
If constitutional prohibitions cannot prevent prosecutorial 
pressure on corporations, changing the rules that prosecutors follow 
in making their indictment decisions may rein in some of the coercive 
conduct.141 This change would involve strengthening the standards by 
which prosecutorial conduct is judged and making sure these 
standards have enough authority that prosecutors will actually follow 
them.142 The necessarily broad discretion that prosecutors enjoy 
makes it difficult, however, to control the process by which they make 
their charging decisions. 
The Filip Memorandum already provides guidelines that 
technically prohibit prosecutors from considering advancement of 
defense costs.143 But this seemingly straightforward answer to the 
problem may not relieve the pressure on individuals. One reason is 
that this change in the guidelines from the Thompson Memorandum 
likely has merely driven consideration of fee payment under the table 
 
 138. See Buell, supra note 27, at 1643 (discussing the problems with extending Fifth 
Amendment protections to employer-coerced statements). 
 139. United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 140. See Stone, supra note 80, at 6–12 (detailing the reasons a corporation may want to cut 
off its employees’ defense costs). 
 141. Stein, supra note 26, at 3292–93 (suggesting that clarifying the DOJ’s prosecution 
guidelines could curb prosecutorial pressure). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Filip Memorandum, supra note 25, at 13. 
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and has had little or no effect on the actual pressure on 
corporations.144 Making the standards for charging considerations 
more explicit does not make the government’s considerations any 
more visible, and in any case these guidelines do not provide 
defendants with a remedy in court and are not otherwise enforceable. 
Any attempts to directly constrain prosecutorial pressure on 
corporations to stop paying their employees’ defense costs face 
significant enforcement problems. The Filip Memorandum guidelines 
and U.S. Attorneys’ Manual are not enforceable in court.145 
Defendants likely would struggle to prove violations of even 
enforceable standards (for example, legislation146 or bar association 
ethical rules) because they cannot see what the prosecution actually 
considered when deciding whether to indict. As Judge Kaplan 
pointed out in Stein I, “whatever the government may do in the 
privacy of U.S. Attorneys’ offices and in the DOJ’s Criminal Division 
is not what defense lawyers see,”147 so defense lawyers likely will 
advise corporations to cut off advancement of attorneys’ fees if they 
have any reason to believe that it will help the corporation avoid 
indictment. As a result, any constraint on prosecutorial discretion 
would have to make prosecutors’ considerations transparent enough 
that defense lawyers actually believe that prosecutors are adhering to 
it. Although imposing stricter standards could make prosecutors’ 
considerations more visible and reduce their ability to apply pressure, 
prosecutors could continue to consider attorneys’ fee advancement if 
they had incentives to make it difficult for corporations to protect 
their employees. 
Prosecutors do have incentives to make it difficult for individual 
defendants to defend themselves by placing pressure on their 
corporate employers. The high-profile nature of corporate-crime 
cases and the public’s desire to see alleged corporate criminals 
harshly punished often encourage prosecutors to obtain guilty pleas 
 
 144. See, e.g., Bohrer & Trencher, supra note 76, at 1488 (“While the McNulty Memo may 
contain some limitations not found in the Thompson Memo, corporations under investigation 
must still offer and give complete and genuine cooperation in order to escape an indictment. 
What this means in practice is still somewhat of an open question.” (footnote omitted)). 
 145. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 1-1.100 (2008), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam; Filip Memorandum, 
supra note 25, at 21. 
 146. For example, Senator Arlen Specter proposed a bill that would have legislated 
something like the guidelines that were incorporated into the McNulty Memorandum. 
Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006, S. 30, 109th Cong.  
 147. United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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or verdicts; public perception may already be that the defendants 
must be guilty based on the estimated widespread harm of their 
actions.148 The public approval of successful prosecutions of corporate 
crime means that prosecutors often go through the “revolving door” 
into lucrative private-practice careers.149 Prosecutors have, and the 
public encourages them to use, increased powers to fight the “war” on 
corporate crime.150 Prosecutors also have the incentive to enter 
deferred prosecution agreements rather than indict firms and risk 
destroying the companies, harming the economy, and drawing public 
disapproval. Instead they prefer focusing on the guilt of individuals in 
the company, which avoids these consequences while still successfully 
punishing the misconduct.151 As long as the government considers 
criminal prosecution to be an important tool for regulating corporate 
misconduct, and as long as societal pressure to search out and punish 
corporate wrongdoers exists, individual prosecutors will continue to 
have motivations to wield their power over corporations to get as 
much cooperation from them as possible, including the refusal to pay 
employees’ defense costs. 
Given these incentives, prosecutors may still continue 
considering the payment of attorneys’ fees when making charging 
decisions despite rules designed to prevent them. More importantly, 
even if prosecutors do not actually consider a firm’s advancement of 
defense costs in charging decisions, corporations, seeing these 
incentives, likely will still feel pressure to cut off their attorneys’ fees 
just in case doing so will save them from indictment. Many white-
 
 148. See Griffin, supra note 28, at 315 (“[T]he perceived scope of contemporary corporate 
crime has inspired particularly zealous tactics.”). 
 149. See Revolving Door, WASH. POST, Nov. 4 2007, at F3 (reporting the hiring of “David 
Esseks, former federal prosecutor who led the government’s fraud case against Refco, as 
litigation partner of law firm Allen & Overy in London”); Posting of Peter Lattman to WSJ.com 
Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/10/13/chicago-law-firms-bid-for-berkowitz (Oct. 13, 
2006, 11:07 EST) (“Sean Berkowitz, the head of the Enron Task Force, plans to join a Chicago 
law firm sometime later this year. . . . If Berkowitz heads to the other side, he will continue the 
trend of Enron Task Force members leaving their government wages behind for high-paying 
law firms.”); see also Ribstein, supra note 26, at 4 (“For many of these lawyers, Enron is not a 
disaster, but a launching pad into lucrative big firm practice or a political career.” (citing Carrie 
Johnson, After Enron, Fighting off the Job Offers, WASH. POST, June 5, 2006, at D2)). 
 150. Griffin, supra note 28, at 315–16 (comparing the war on corporate crime to the wars on 
terrorism and drugs and the expansion of power in the USA PATRIOT Act and increased drug 
criminalization to “new cooperation requirements [that] allow prosecutors to compel individual 
employee statements, to constrain defense resources, and in some cases of derivative 
obstruction, effectively to create the crime” (footnote omitted)). 
 151. Bohrer & Trencher, supra note 76, at 1483. 
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collar defendants will inevitably face some level of coercion to plead 
guilty as a result of the high costs of defending corporate crime and 
their lack of funding to defend themselves. 
CONCLUSION 
The pressures this Note describes are inherent in corporate-
crime prosecutions. They are not necessarily simply due to bad 
prosecutorial practices, and when they are, these practices will be 
difficult to curb because of the strong motivations behind them and 
the necessary lack of transparency in the prosecutorial process. The 
pressures on white-collar defendants arise from a confluence of 
factors, all of which are unavoidable aspects of corporate-crime 
prosecutions: the difficulty of getting evidence, the unclear criminal 
standards, and the intricate mens rea inquiries. No constitutional 
protections, indemnification agreements, or attempts to change 
prosecutorial behavior will be able to eliminate the intense pressures 
on the parties to white-collar criminal prosecutions or the difficulty 
inherent in defending them. 
Scholars debating the criminalization of corporate behavior 
address several fundamental reasons for narrowing the coverage of 
criminal law in the corporate context. In weighing the costs and 
benefits of when to use criminal rather than civil remedies, 
commentators have considered the breadth of prosecutorial 
discretion,152 the moral basis for punishment,153 the difficulty of 
judging guilt,154 and the effectiveness of noncriminal remedies to deter 
the behavior.155 Although this Note’s analysis indirectly touches many 
of these factors, it focuses on one that commentators have not 
previously weighed: the financial cost of defending these crimes. Like 
some of the other considerations scholars have addressed, the high 
price of defense separates corporate crime from other types of crime 
and contributes to the unique pressure on corporate defendants. 
Unlike some of the other considerations, even procedural or most 
legislative adjustments cannot directly fix it; any investigation into the 
complicated workings of a corporation is necessarily expensive to the 
point of being beyond the means of almost any individual.156 
 
 152. Lynch, supra note 31, at 58–60. 
 153. Id. at 48–52. 
 154. Ribstein, supra note 26, at 5–6. 
 155. Booth, supra note 31, at 128–33. 
 156. See supra Part I. 
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Because the problems are inherent in the criminalization of 
corporate behavior, legislators must consider them when passing 
criminal laws. Others have suggested legislative reform that would 
clarify and limit the criminalization of corporate conduct with an eye 
to limiting prosecutorial discretion.157 Commentators have suggested 
instituting an affirmative good faith defense;158 avoiding the 
imposition of criminal penalties on regulatory infractions;159 and a 
threefold approach involving limiting the respondeat superior 
standard, imposing a presumption of due diligence in corporate 
behavior, and establishing a presumption against indictment of a firm 
unless the government shows that civil and regulatory options are 
inadequate.160 
This Note does not attempt to propose a specific legislative 
solution, but rather identifies a previously undeveloped approach to 
the debate. This Note suggests a way to evaluate legislative options; if 
a suggested reform would not lower the financial burden on 
defendants or the pressure on them to plead guilty, then the reform 
would not resolve the coercion problems this Note has outlined. 
When deciding whether to criminalize certain corporate behavior, the 
legislature should consider the implications of its decision for 
individual defendants; when criminalizing corporate conduct would 
create the type of unfair pressure this Note has described, the 
legislature should instead turn to other methods of dealing with the 
wrongdoing, such as civil remedies or regulatory oversight. When 
legislating, Congress must look beyond punishment and deterrence 
and consider whether, in practice, criminal laws would subject 
defendants to impossible dilemmas. If, as this Note argues, the 
pressures on white-collar defendants are inherent in the process of 
prosecuting white-collar crime, then policymakers must consider 
these pressures when balancing the costs and benefits of criminalizing 
the behavior in the first place. 
 
 157. Bharara, supra note 26, at 107. 
 158. Ellen S. Podgor, A New Corporate World Mandates a “Good Faith” Affirmative 
Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1537, 1543 (2007). 
 159. Thornburgh, supra note 31, at 1285–86. 
 160. Pamela H. Bucy, Why Punish? Trends in Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 44 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1287, 1303 (2007). 
